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AbstrAct: This article deals with the problem of collecting, retaining 
and processing location data for use in criminal proceedings. The 
collection of location data is an interference with the right to privacy 
(the Article 8 of the ECHR, the Article 7 of the Charter). However, such 
interference is permissible if it pursues the aims indicated in Article 8(2) 
of the ECHR (prevention of and fight against serious crime, protection 
of general security, national security). Therefore, the question arises 
as to when the procedural authorities may obtain location data (what 
offences may justify interference with the right to privacy) and what 
conditions should be met by national law with regard to this issue. 
The ECtHR and the CJEU are increasingly dealing with cases that 
concern the collection of location data in real time and data retention 
by telecommunications service providers. This requires an assessment 
of whether a European standard has now been developed and, if so, 
what is the standard?
Keywords: Criminal procedure; Human rights; Right to privacy; Location 
data; Data retention.
resumo: Este artigo analisa o problema da coleta, custódia e processamento 
de dados de localização para uso em processos penais. A coleta de dados de 
1 This work is a result of the research project funded by the National Science Cen-
tre No. 2017/27/B/HS5/00854
2 PhD candidate, University of Wrocław, Poland.
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localização é uma restrição ao direito à privacidade (art. 8, CEDH; art. 8, 
Carta de Direitos Fundamentais da UE). Contudo, isso é permitido se almejar 
o objetivo indicado no art. 8(2) da CEDH (prevenção e combate a crimes 
graves, proteção da segurança pública e nacional). Assim, a questão surge 
sobre quando as autoridades podem obter os dados de localização (quais 
crimes podem justificar essa restrição à privacidade) e em que condições 
devem ser respeitadas pelas legislações nacionais sobre o tema. O TEDH e o 
Tribunal de Justiça da UE estão lidando cada vez mais com casos relacionados 
à coleta de dados de localização em tempo real e a sua custódia pelos 
provedores de serviços de telecomunicações. Isso a verificação de se os 
parâmetros europeus foram desenvolvidos e, em caso positivo, quais são eles.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: processo penal; direitos humanos; direito à privacidade; 
dados de localização; custódia de dados.
1. IntroductIon
Location data allows determination of the profile and routine 
of life, the place where one stays and for how long one stays in a 
given place3. The collection, processing and storage of such data is an 
interference in the right to privacy (Article 8 of the ECHR4, Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter5). Constant monitoring of an individual’s behaviour, 
wherever they are, may give the impression that he/she is under 
constant surveillance. There is no doubt, however, that location data 
can provide relevant information that can assist authorities involved 
in criminal proceedings. Intervention into the sphere of privacy of an 
individual is warranted as long as it serves the purposes indicated in art. 
3 STACHNIK-ROGALSKA, Agnieszka; ROGALSKI Maciej. Udostępnianie 
billingów rozmów telefonicznych. Państwo i Prawo no. 8, p. 31-32, 2012. 
4 EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, adopted in Rome on 4th 
November 1950. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/con-
vention_eng.pdf. (access: December 20, 2020). Hereinafter: the ECHR. 
5 CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the European Union no. C 326/391 on 26th 
October 2012. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TX-
T/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. Hereinafter: the Charter. 
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8 sec. 2 of the ECHR, and the interference itself fulfils the condition of 
proportionality and necessity in a democratic society6. The restriction 
of the rights of an individual must be proportionate to the aims that 
the procedural organs wish to achieve, and the expected positive 
consequences (ensuring public safety, combating crime) must exceed 
the negative consequences of violating rights and individual freedom.
In EU law, as defined in Directive 2002/58/EC and of the 
Council of 12th July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(hereinafter: Directive on privacy and electronic communications; 
Directive 2002/58) “location data” is understood as “any data 
processed in an electronic communications network, indicating the 
geographical location of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly 
available electronic communications service”7. They are considered 
a type of “personal data”8 within the meaning of Directive 2016/680 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27th April 2016 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of crime 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of offences and 
execution of punishments, on the free movement of such data and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977 / JHA (hereinafter: 
Directive 2016/680)9. The Strasbourg Court10 - in view of the absence 
of a separate definition of location data in legal acts adopted at the 
6  BREYER, Patric. Telecommunication Data Retention. European Law Journal, 
v. 11, no. 3, s. 365, 2005. 
7 The Official Journal of the European Union no. L 201/37 on 31st July 2002. 
See: article 2 point c. 
8 In accordance with the Article 3 of the Directive 2016/680 “personal data” 
means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural per-
son (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be iden-
tified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such 
as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to 
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. 
9 The Official Journal of the European Union no. L 119/89 on 47t April 2016.
10 The European Court of Human Rights.
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forum of the Council of Europe - uses the definitions adopted in the 
European Union11. 
The CJEU12 and the ECtHR13 emphasise the need to balance the 
interests of the individual and the protection of public safety14. The rights 
to privacy and confidentiality of location data are an important value in 
a democratic society, but in justified cases, e.g. in connection with the 
need to fight and prevent crime, it is permissible to interfere with the 
rights of an individual. Based on the case law of the European Courts and 
current legislation, it is possible to establish rules for the collection of 
location data in national law for the purpose of using this data in criminal 
proceedings. Before analysing this issue, however, it should be clarified 
how the procedural authorities can obtain location data. Following the 
ECtHR jurisprudence15, the following can be distinguished:
1) real-time data collection (e.g. using GPS transmitters), and
2) obtaining “historical” data, i.e. retained by telecommunications 
service providers (e.g. from radio transmitters) or collected by applications 
installed on smartphones and saved on these devices (e.g. data on places 
where one connects to the wifi network, data derived from Google maps).
As for the technical aspects of locating, for example a smartphone 
user, it is possible to indicate systems based on: 1) obtaining location 
data based on GPS; 2) connecting the smartphone to the wi-fi network; 
3) GSM technology; 4) determining the location of the radio signal; 
5) GNSS.16 The technical aspects of collecting and obtaining location 
data - although important for smartphone users, tablets, etc. - are of little 
11 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben 
Faiza v France, case no. 31446/12. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. 
12 The Court of Justice of the European Union.
13 The European Court of Human Rights. 
14 DOCKSEY, Christopher, HIJMANS, Hielke, The Court of Justice as a Key 
Player in Privacy and Data Protection: An Overview of Recent Trends in Case 
Law at the Start of a New Era of Data Protection Law. European Data Protec-
tion Law Review (EDPL), vol. 5, no. 3, p. 300-316, 2019. 
15 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben 
Faiza v France, case no. 31446/12. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. 
16 BU-PASHA, Shakila, ALEN-SAVIKKO, Anette, MEIKINEN, Jenna, GUINNESS, 
Robert, KORPISAAR, Päivi. EU Law Perspectives on Location Data Privacy in 
Smartphones and Informed Consent for Transparency. European Data Protection 
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importance from the perspective of establishing the rules for accessing 
this data. Whatever the information gathering technique, access can only 
be obtained in two ways - either in real time or ex post.
Interference in the privacy of individuals cannot be arbitrary - 
state authorities cannot ‘cut corners’ to ensure security and public order. 
Although the technical possibilities for tracking an individual’s behaviour 
are almost unlimited, they should not be overused. The aim of this paper 
is to determine whether there is a common European standard for the 
gathering and processing of location data to prevent and combat crime. 
The ECtHR and the CJEU are increasingly addressing this issue. However, 
the question arises whether, at this stage, it is reasonable to claim that a 
standard has already emerged. 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CJEU is structured 
according to the way in which data is collected, i.e. either in real time or 
ex post (from mobile phone companies). The decisions of the Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg tribunals were analysed chronologically. This method 
made it possible to show the evolution of the case law and the attempt 
to adapt the rulings to changing technical conditions. 
2. LImItatIon of the rIght to prIvacy – generaL ruLes 
The collection of location data in the case-law of the ECtHR is 
considered under Art. 8 of the ECHR. In assessing a complaint of a breach 
of the right to privacy, the Court takes into account three factors17:
1.the existence of legal bases in domestic law allowing interference 
in the sphere of privacy of an individual;
Law Review (EDPL), vol. 2, no. 3, p. 312-323, 2016. https://heinonline.org/
HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/edpl2&div=57&id=&page=. 
17 See also: GARLICKI, Lech in: GARLICKI, Lech, HOFMAŃSKI, Piotr. Kon-
wencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Tom I. Ko-
mentarz do artykułów 1–18, Warszawa 2011; JASIŃSKI, Wojciech, The lim-
its of interference with the right to liberty, privacy property and privilege 
against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings – European standards, 
in: SKORUPKA, Jerzy (ed.), The Model of Acceptable Interference with the 
Rights and Freedoms of a Individual in the Criminal Process, p. 450; 463. 
Warsaw 2017.
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2. the implementation by public authorities of the objectives 
indicated in Art. 8 sec. 2 of the ECHR
3. the necessity to interfere with the right to privacy in a 
democratic society18.
The requirement that any interference with the individual’s 
right to privacy be properly grounded in national legislation is tied to the 
necessity of ensuring the predictability of the procedure. In the judgement 
in the case Roman Zakharov against Russia, the Court recalled that the 
predictability of the proceedings does not mean that a given person should 
be able to predict when discreet surveillance measures will be imposed 
on him and therefore be able to adapt his behaviour to the situation19. The 
point is, however, to define the limits of the legality of the actions of public 
authorities, in order to prevent arbitrary interference with the privacy 
of an individual. The minimum guarantees that should be provided are:
1.determination of the nature of crimes in cases for which covert 
surveillance measures may be applied, but the catalogue cannot be too 
wide;
2. defining the categories of persons against whom covert 
surveillance measures may be taken;
3. setting a time limit for the application of these measures;
4. establishing a procedure for testing, using and storing data;
5. introducing precautionary measures when communicating 
data to other people;
6. specifying the circumstances when data may be deleted or 
destroyed20.
The ECtHR also points to the necessity of finding an appropriate 
balance between the interests of the state and the pursuit of public security 
18 JASIŃSKI, Wojciech, The limits of interference with the right to liberty, pri-
vacy property and privilege against self-incrimination in criminal proceed-
ings – European standards, in: SKORUPKA, Jerzy (ed.), The Model of Ac-
ceptable Interference with the Rights and Freedoms of a Individual in the 
Criminal Process, p. 450, Warsaw 2017.
19 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 4 December 2015, Ro-
man Zakharov v Russia, case no. 47143/06, § 229. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. 
20 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 4 December 2015, Ro-
man Zakharov v Russia, case no. 47143/06, § 231. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. 
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(and achievement of the objectives of Article 8 (2) of the ECHR). The 
margin of freedom of states in introducing specific normative solutions 
is limited and subject to “supervision” of the Tribunal in Strasbourg21. 
Technical measures aimed at protecting a democratic society must not lead 
to the destruction of democracy in a given country. When interpreting the 
concept of “necessity”, the Court indicates that it should be understood 
as a situation in which the interference is justified by a pressing social 
need, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued22. Therefore, it is 
crucial to put in place effective and adequate procedural guarantees to 
prevent possible abuses. The nature and type of procedural guarantees 
depend on the degree of interference with the privacy of the individual. 
The more intrusive the activity is, the stronger these guarantees should 
be provided for the individual.
3. reaL-tIme data coLLectIon 
3.1. reAl-time dAtA collection in the ecthr jurisPrudence 
The first case in which the Strasbourg Court analysed problematic 
real-time data collection was the case of Uzun vs. Germany23. The 
applicant - suspected of participating in a terrorist group and committing 
crimes in connection with the activities of that organisation24 - was ordered 
to be under secret surveillance and tracked via a GPS transmitter in his 
car. Thanks to the information obtained from real-time location data 
collection, the trial authorities obtained incriminating evidence, which 
then became the basis for his conviction. Although the applicant was not 
21 See also: STEIN Shlomit, In Search of ‘Red Lines’ in the Jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR on Fair Trial Rights. Israel Law Review v. 50, no. 2, p. 177–209, 2017. 
22 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 September 2010, 
Uzun v Germany, case no. 35623/05, § 78-79. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
23 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 September 2010, 
Uzun v Germany, case no. 35623/05. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
24 An organization was called “Antiimperialistische Zelle”. The applicant was con-
victed for attempted murder and causing four explosion (terrorist attack) to 13 
years imprisonment. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 
September 2010, Uzun v Germany, case no. 35623/05, § 11, 17 and 49.
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personally subject to geolocation - a GPS transmitter was installed in the 
car and therefore the movements of every person who used the vehicle 
were monitored25 - the ECtHR found that the measures applied constituted 
an interference with the right to privacy (Article 8 of the ECHR)26. 
However, the Strasbourg Court noted that the collection of location 
data should be distinguished from that of surveillance, which is video or 
sound recording. By their very nature, covert surveillance methods that 
permit “spying” on a person’s life are more intrusive to privacy than GPS 
data observation and collection. Assessing the provisions of the German 
Code of Criminal Procedure27 from the perspective of “lawfulness” and 
predictability of the proceedings, the ECtHR noted that they did not 
refer directly to the possibility of applying geolocation surveillance, but 
indicated the possibility of using technical means - other than image or 
sound recording - enabling the determination of the observed person’s 
whereabouts. Sharing the position of the German courts, the ECtHR 
decided that in connection with the development of technology in the 
field of Art. 100c § 1 section 1 lit. b of the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure it also included collecting location data using a GPS transmitter. 
Although at that time there were no regulations limiting the duration of 
geolocation surveillance, the regulations required that one month from 
the date of ordering surveillance by the prosecutor, the observation was 
extended by the court28. Judicial control was an important guarantee 
against the use of illegally obtained location data and the arbitrariness of 
the actions of law enforcement agencies. In the opinion of the ECtHR - 
and due to the fact that geolocation surveillance interferes less with the 
sphere of privacy of an individual than, for example, control and recording 
25 It is worth to mention that the car, where the GPS transmitter was installed 
by the public authorities, did not belong to the applicant, but to his partner. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 September 2010, 
Uzun v Germany, case no. 35623/05, § 11, 17 and 49.
26 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 September 2010, 
Uzun v Germany, case no. 35623/05, § 52.
27 The application of geolocation surveillance was based on Article 100c § 1 
point 1 (b) of the German Code of Criminal Proceedings. EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 September 2010, Uzun v Ger-
many, case no. 35623/05, § 64 and 65. 
28 Ibidem, § 71.
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of conversations - it is not necessary for the judicial authority to decide 
on the collection of location data29. Due to the allegations made against 
the applicant - participation in a terrorist group, attempted murder - the 
use of covert surveillance measures was justified on the grounds of 
protection of public safety, in particular by preventing new (terrorist) 
bomb attacks. Moreover, the previously-used less invasive investigative 
techniques did not bring the expected results (they did not prevent the 
applicant from committing new crimes)30. Considering the circumstances 
of the case, the actions of law enforcement agencies, the procedural 
guarantees that German legislation provided for people who were subject 
to covert surveillance and the fact that the investigative steps taken were 
necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR found that there had been 
no violation of Art. 8 sec. 1 of the ECHR.
The Strasbourg Court also dealt with the issue of collecting data 
on the location in the judgement of Ben Faiza against France31. In this 
judgment, the ECtHR relied on the Uzun v Germany judgement, using 
the principles developed there. Compared to the previous decision, the 
novelty was to draw attention to the fact that geolocation monitoring 
may be applied in two forms: by means of a GPS device installed, for 
example, directly in a car or other means of transport, or by using its own 
telephone technology (smartphone), tablet or GPS system included with 
the car32. When analysing French law, the ECtHR noted that, at the time 
when geolocation surveillance was applied to the applicant, the provisions 
were not precise enough. The provision of art. 81 of the French CCP 
29 Ibidem, § 73. 
30 Ibidem, § 79-80.
31 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, 
Ben Faiza v France, case no. 31446/12. The case concerned the allegation of 
involvement in an organised criminal group and drug trafficking and smug-
gling. Apart from geolocation surveillance, other means of covert surveil-
lance were used against the complainant, such as interception, transmission 
and recording of calls. See: § 54. 
32 At the time when geolocation surveillance was applied in the Uzun v. Ger-
many case, the technology was not yet at such a high level, including smart-
phones that automatically collect location data. EUROPEAN COURT OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben Faiza v France, case no. 
31446/12, § 53.
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referred to “informational activities useful for revealing the truth”33. This 
regulation did not ensure the predictability of the proceedings within 
the meaning of Art. 8 of the ECHR - it did not define the conditions 
and rules for collecting location data with sufficient precision - and the 
jurisprudence of French courts did not develop mechanisms that would 
protect individuals against unjustified interference with the right to 
privacy. Due to the defectiveness of the legislation in force in France 
at the time, the Court found that there had been a violation of Art. 8 of 
the ECHR, without considering whether the application of geolocation 
surveillance was necessary in a democratic society and served the purposes 
of Art. 8 sec. 2 of the ECHR34.
3.2. reAl-time dAtA collection in the eu lAw And cjeu jurisPrudence 
Legislation adopted in the EU requires EU member states to 
adopt “effective investigative tools” in relation to organised crime 
and other serious crime, including money laundering35, sexual crimes 
against children36 (sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, child pornography, 
33 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben 
Faiza v France, case no. 31446/12, § 58.
34 Following the conclusion of the applicant’s case, regulations were introduced 
in France in 2014 which clarified the application of geolocation surveillance 
and provided procedural guarantees for the individual to prevent unautho-
rised interference with the right to privacy. EUROPEAN COURT OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben Faiza v France, case no. 
31446/12; § 39. 
35 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union no. L 141/73 of 5 June 2015. eur-lex.europa.
eu. Access on December 20, 2020. 
36 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2011/92 of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexu-
al abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and re-
placing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union no. L 335/1 of 17 December 2011, eur-lex.
europa.eu. Access on December 20, 2020. 
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solicitation of children for sexual purposes), illegal drug trafficking37, 
trafficking in human beings38 or protection of the EU’s financial interests. 
One such “effective tool” is real-time location data tracking. For the first 
time, the issue of real-time geolocation supervision was dealt with by the 
Luxembourg Court in the case of La Quadraturedu Net and the Others39, 
and in its ruling it took into account the position of the ECtHR, recognising 
the Strasbourg standard as the minimum EU standard40.
Contrary to the cases heard by the Strasbourg court, the CJEU 
examined French regulations that obliged electronic service providers 
to retain and process - in an automated manner - data on the location of 
persons who were suspected of committing a serious crime or posing a 
threat to national security41. However, the Luxembourg Court noted that 
in practice, this led to real-time geolocation surveillance being extended 
to all electronic communications users - irrespective of whether the 
person was actually involved in any prohibited act. Although location 
37 COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 
laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal 
acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking; published in the Offi-
cial Journal of the European Union no. L 335/8 of 25 October 2004, eur-lex.
europa.eu. Access on December 20, 2020. 
38 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2011/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/
JHA, published in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 101/1 of 
April 2011, eur-lex.europa.eu. Access on December 20, 2020. 
39 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment (Grand Cham-
ber) of 6 October 2020. C-511/18, C-512/18, C-520/18, La Quadrature du 
Net, French Data Network, Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet 
associatifs, Igwan.net (hereinafter: La Quadrature du Net and the others). 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
40 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment (Grand Cham-
ber) of 6 October 2020. C-511/18, C-512/18, C-520/18, La Quadrature du 
Net, French Data Network, Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet 
associatifs, Igwan.net, § 124. 
41 See: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment (Grand 
Chamber) of 6 October 2020. C-511/18, C-512/18, C-520/18, La Quadrature 
du Net, French Data Network, Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet 
associatifs, Igwan.net, § 41-45. Those regulations was introduced to prevent 
and fight with terrorist crime. 
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data was collected anonymously, it was possible to identify the user if 
this information was relevant to the criminal proceedings42.
The CJEU found that the automated geolocation surveillance of 
the almost unlimited number of users of electronic communications goes 
beyond what is necessary to ensure national security. It is necessary to 
apply criteria limiting the number of people subject to discrete geolocation 
surveillance43. The earlier agreed models of automatic data processing 
and the criteria of those people against whom geolocation surveillance 
may be used, should be specific and credible (enabling the achievement 
of results identifying persons with a justified suspicion of involvement 
in terrorist offences) and non-discriminatory. There is a need for prior 
judicial review or other independent body to assess whether automatic 
retention of location data is acceptable in a given case44. If the information 
obtained as a result of automatic mass data retention provided information 
essential for maintaining national security (e.g. that thanks to it, members 
of an organised terrorist group were identified), the possibility of their use 
in a criminal trial depends on the subsequent assessment of the court. An 
individualised, non-automated analysis is required as to whether discreet 
geolocation surveillance and data collection have been carried out in 
accordance with the law and served the purposes provided for by this law45.
42 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment (Grand Cham-
ber) of 6 October 2020. C-511/18, C-512/18, C-520/18, La Quadrature du 
Net, French Data Network, Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet 
associatifs, Igwan.net, § 185-187. The CJEU referred to the ECtHR judgment 
in case Ben Faiza v France. 
43 However, this time may be extended if necessary in a specific case. 
44 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment (Grand Cham-
ber) of 6 October 2020. C-511/18, C-512/18, C-520/18, La Quadrature du 
Net, French Data Network, Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet 
associatifs, Igwan.net, § 183-189.
45 Ibidem. It is also worth mentioning that the CJEU requires regular publica-
tion of general information (reports) on the scale of secret geolocation sur-
veillance. Individual notification of persons who have been subject to such 
supervision is not necessary. However, if the automatic analysis of location 
data is ‘deepened’, i.e. a specific individual is identified and his behaviour is 
further analysed, he should be informed that he has been subject to secret 
surveillance. However, such information must not affect the tasks of process 
authorities. See: ibidem, § 190-192. 
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3.3. PArtiAl conclusions 
Summing up, when it comes to collecting real-time location data, 
it is difficult to speak of a developed European standard at this stage. The 
Strasbourg case-law cannot be considered as developed - the ECtHR has 
dealt with this issue only twice. Nevertheless, at a very general level, 
it is possible to determine what conditions should be met by national 
law so that the interference with the privacy of an individual as a result 
of geolocation supervision does not lead to violation of Art. 8 sec. 1 
of the ECHR. Firstly, the collection of location data is not “reserved” 
exclusively for serious crime and may also be used in more common 
criminal offences. The ECtHR considers geolocation supervision to be 
a measure less intrusive to the privacy of an individual than other forms 
of covert surveillance, which allow, inter alia, to record the content of 
conversations or the image of a given person. Consequently, this form of 
collecting data about an individual may be used in a greater number of 
cases. Secondly, the Court emphasises the need to introduce procedural 
guarantees that will prevent abuse and unjustified interference with the 
privacy of an individual. National legislation should specify:
1. material scope, i.e. in cases of what crimes geolocation sur-
veillance can be applied,
2. the subjective scope, i.e. the categories of people for whom 
real-time geolocation surveillance can be used, should be 
defined,
3. temporal scope, i.e. the maximum period during which re-
al-time tracking of the individual’s movement is allowed.
Thirdly, geolocation surveillance does not have to be ordered by 
a judicial authority and the ECtHR considers that judicial control at the 
stage of assessing the admissibility of using location data is sufficient. 
The court should check not only whether the statutory conditions for 
geolocation surveillance have been formally met, but also assess whether 
such action was “necessary in a democratic society”.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has so far dealt with 
the problem of mass, automated retention and processing of location 
data of an unlimited group of users in order to ensure national security. 
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It has allowed for the possibility of automated analysis and collection of 
location data and the obligation for electronic service providers to transmit 
this data to procedural authorities, but such activities must be limited 
to situations where there is a serious threat to national security and it 
is necessary to ensure effective judicial or independent administrative 
control. In addition, the collection of real-time traffic and location data 
must be restricted to only persons reasonably suspected of being involved 
in terrorist activities, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure national 
security. National legislation should provide for a maximum period of 
application of covert geolocation surveillance, but it may be extended - in 
particularly justified situations.
4.  coLLectIng LocatIon data from provIders of eLectronIc 
communIcatIons servIces
4.1.  collecting locAtion dAtA from Providers of electronic 
communicAtions services – the ecthr jurisPrudence 
The Strasbourg Court first dealt with the issue of access to 
location data stored by mobile network operators in the judgement of 
Ben Faiza against France46, which emphasised that any data collection 
and retention related to the use of a telephone without the knowledge 
of the person concerned, constitutes an interference with the right to 
respect for private life under the article 8 of the ECHR47. It is necessary 
to distinguish between situations in which state authorities create a 
system of surveillance of an individual and monitor their behaviour “on 
an ongoing basis” from the transfer of information obtained by that entity 
by a private entity, if it is necessary to establish the circumstances of a 
criminal case. In the opinion of the ECtHR, obtaining a posteriori access 
46 It is worth to mention that the ECtHR referred to previous judgments in cas-
es of the access to list of telephone calls. See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 1 March 2007, Heglas v the Czech Republic, case 
no. 5935/02, § 61; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 
December 2009, Previti v Italy, case no. 45291/06, § 303. 
47 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben 
Faiza v France, case no. 31446/12.
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to location data constitutes less interference with the right to privacy 
than monitoring the individual’s movement in real time48. Nevertheless, 
the duty of state authorities is to comply with the general rules allowing 
for interference in the private sphere, i.e. such interference must be 
grounded in national law and serve the purposes of art. 8 sec. 2 of the 
ECHR and fulfil the condition of necessity in a democratic society. When 
assessing the French legislation, the Court found that there had been no 
violation of Art. 8 sec. 1 of the ECHR. The regulations specified which 
authority could turn to the mobile network operator, in which cases 
this measure was admissible, and the use of location data was subject to 
judicial review49. There was also an important public interest justifying 
the interference with the individual’s right to privacy. The applicant was 
charged with serious crimes - participation in an organised criminal 
group and drug trafficking, and the information obtained thanks to 
geolocation data was necessary to establish the truth in the trial.
In the decisions of Ringler vs. Austria50 and Tretter and others 
vs. Austria51, the ECtHR assessed the Austrian provisions allowing 
procedural authorities to request mobile network operators to disclose 
personal data, e.g. location data, list of calls, personal data of the user of 
a given telephone number, and IP address52. In order to obtain data from 
the network operator, the law enforcement authorities had to adequately 
justify such a request, indicating that there is a threat and that the data 
is necessary for the performance of police tasks. With regard to location 
data, it was necessary to indicate that there was a direct threat to the life 
48 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 8 February 2018, Ben 
Faiza v France, case no. 31446/12, § 71.
49 Ibidem, § 79. The court assessed whether recourse to the mobile network 
operator was lawful and, if it considered it was not, it had the right to exclude 
the material thus obtained from the evidence base.
50 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 12 May 2020, Ringler 
v Austria, case no. 2309/10. 
51 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 29 September 2020, 
Tretter and the others v Austria, case no. 3599/10. 
52 See: the Article 53 sec. 3a and 3b Sicherheitspolizeigesetz. See also: EUROPE-
AN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 12 May 2020, Ringler v Austria, 
case no. 2309/10, § 4-23. 
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or health of a specific person. Subsequent changes to the regulations53 
extended the possibility of requesting access to location data to include 
situations where there is a direct threat to the freedom of a person. In 
such a situation, the procedural authorities could ask for geolocation 
information of the person who was in danger (the aggrieved party), 
and not only the person suspected of committing a crime54. Austrian 
regulations guaranteed the person whose data had been transferred to 
law enforcement authorities the right to submit a request for information 
on the actions taken against him and the sharing of data with the police 
authorities, he could request the deletion of data, and the supervision 
of the correct disclosure and processing of personal data was exercised 
by an independent authority55. In the Ringler and Tretter and Others 
vs. Austria cases, the applicants argued that the provisions did not 
provide for an effective measures in protecting individual rights and 
freedoms56. The mechanism of notifying the transfer of personal data 
(including location data) was questioned. According to the complainants, 
it cannot be expected that the individuals will regularly request state 
authorities to provide information on whether their personal data has 
been transferred to the police authorities in connection with ongoing 
53 Amendments were introduced on 1 April 2012, 1 April 2014, 1 June 2016 
and 25 May 2018 due to obligation to implement the EU directives, especially 
the directive 2016/680, and REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 of European Par-
liament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Reg-
ulation; published in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 119/1 
of 4 May 2016) which has entered into force on 25 May 2018. 
54 The amendments have extended the possibility of requesting the data of a 
mobile phone user, also in order to avoid endangering life, health or freedom, 
to avoid an intentional crime or to stop the activities of criminal groups. EU-
ROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 12 May 2020, Ringler v 
Austria, case no. 2309/10, § 23. See also: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS. Decision of 29 September 2020, Tretter and the others v Austria, case 
no. 3599/10, § 18.
55 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 29 September 2020, 
Tretter and the others v Austria, case no. 3599/10, § 34. 
56 In the meaning of the Article 13 ECtHR. 
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criminal proceedings57. Moreover, the regulations allow one to request 
access to geolocation data in any circumstances - the regulations do 
not impose any restrictions58. The victim’s status59 was justified by 
the inability to prove that the applicants had been subject to covert 
surveillance measures and their personal data (including location data) 
had been transferred to the police60.
In Ringler vs. Austria and Tretter and the other vs. Austria cases 
the ECtHR recalled that its role was not to summarise the national law of a 
country or the practice of procedural authorities, but to establish whether, 
in a particular case, the application of national regulations had led to a 
violation of the Convention61. Nevertheless, the specific characteristics 
of covert surveillance measures mean that an individual may sometimes 
rely on the fact that he or she is a victim of the very existence of covert 
surveillance provisions, even if he is unable to demonstrate that such 
measures were applied to him62. In assessing whether this is the case, 
the Court takes into account:
1. the scope of application of the provisions allowing for a covert 
interference in an individual’s privacy (objective, subjective 
and temporal), whether such measures could potentially be 
applied to the complainant due to belonging to a specific 
category of persons to whom national provisions apply, or 
examines whether the provisions have a direct impact on all 
users of electronic communications:
57 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 29 September 2020, 
Tretter and the others v Austria, case no. 3599/10, § 58. 
58 Ibidem, § 52.
59 In both cases the Austrian Government contested the victim status of the 
applicants. 
60 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 29 September 2020, 
Tretter and the others v Austria, case no. 3599/10, § 47-50. EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 12 May 2020, Ringler v Austria, 
case no. 2309/10, § 55. 
61 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 12 May 2020, Ringler 
v Austria, case no. 2309/10, § 58 and further the ECtHR jurisprudence. 
62 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 12 January 2016, Sz-
abó and Vissy v Hungary, case no. 37138/14, § 33. 
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2. availability of domestic remedies; Where there is no possibi-
lity at national level to challenge the use of covert surveillance 
measures, public fears that power may be abused may be 
justified, and therefore the ECtHR needs to be scrutinised63.
The ECtHR agreed with the applicants that the right to request 
information as to whether an individual had been subjected to covert 
surveillance measures was of no practical importance64. However, it 
noted that law enforcement authorities were required to notify an 
independent authority about requests made to mobile network operators. 
The authority is obliged to inform the person - upon his / her request - 
about any unlawful measures that were applied against him, and if he 
refuses to provide information - the person may submit a complaint 
to an independent commission whose decisions are subject to judicial 
review65. It may also demand the deletion, rectification or limitation of 
the processing of personal data, if they are no longer needed to protect 
public security. Apart from the supervisory authority of the protection of 
personal data, the personal data protection commission and the judicial 
control of decisions issued by the commission, the system of measures to 
protect individual rights is supplemented by the institution of the Legal 
Protection Commissioner, who has the right to access and control the 
correct application of the provisions on the protection of personal data66.
In the cases of Ringler and Tretter and others vs. Austria, the 
Court dismissed the complaints, questioning the applicants’ victim 
status. Nor did he find that there were grounds for an abstract review of 
Austrian legislation. It is worth noting, however, that although the ECtHR 
stated that it did not assess in abstracto the legislation of the countries 
of the Council of Europe, in fact - as if in response to the complainants’ 
allegation - it assessed that the Austrian provisions guarantee effective 
means of protecting an individual against unauthorised interference with 
63 Ibidem, § 36. 
64 The ECtHR has takien into account the scope of exceptions that allow 
non-disclosure of such information. 
65 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Decision of 12 May 2020, Ringler 
v Austria, case no. 2309/10, § 44.
66 Ibidem, § 78. 
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the right to privacy. Although he found some mechanisms (e.g. informing 
an individual about the use of covert surveillance measures against 
him / her to be burdensome and even devoid of practical significance), 
due to the existence of an independent system of supervision over the 
correct processing of personal data, the ECtHR found that the measures 
available at the national level to protect individual rights and freedoms are 
sufficient, and therefore no Strasbourg intervention is necessary. However, 
it should be emphasised that when assessing the Austrian regulations, 
the Court essentially examined the compliance of EU solutions regarding 
the protection of personal data, including location data, introduced by 
Directive 2016/680.
At present, it appears that the Strasbourg Court is avoiding taking 
a position on the issue of access to location data collected by mobile 
operators. The rules that the ECtHR has developed in relation to access to 
the lists of calls made by the telephone user cannot be applied analogously. 
This is because location data provides other types of information to 
procedural authorities and are used for a different purpose. Billing data 
provides information on who the person contacted, how long the call 
lasted, and how many times it was made within a certain period of time. 
Location data refer to the places where a given person has been, they allow 
to determine their pattern of behaviour. They interfere with the privacy 
of an individual to a greater degree than the list of calls. It is difficult to 
determine, solely on the basis of the judgement of Ben Faiz vs. France, 
what are the requirements of the ECtHR with regard to the countries 
of the Council of Europe regarding the regulation of the issue of access 
to location data. In the decisions of Ringler and Tretter and others vs. 
Austria, the Court did not present its own position, but only held that 
Austrian solutions - implementing EU solutions - were compatible with 
the Convention.
4.2.  collecting locAtion dAtA from Providers of electronic 
communicAtions services – the eu lAw And the cjeu 
jurisPrudence 
Much attention is paid to the issue of collecting and sharing 
location data with procedural authorities in relation to the prevention 
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and combating crime in EU law and the jurisprudence of the CJEU67. The 
provision of the Article 5 of Directive 2002/58 introduces the principle of 
confidentiality of communications, including the confidentiality of location 
data. Derogations from this principle are possible for the purposes of 
ensuring national security, state security, defence, public safety and for the 
purpose of detecting, investigating and punishing criminal offences (Article 
15 of Directive 2002/58). National law must ensure that the investigative 
measures used in a specific case are necessary, appropriate and proportionate 
in a democratic society. The clause limiting the confidentiality of location 
data is exhaustive and cannot be interpreted extensively. Location data 
is retained in accordance with EU law, provided that the purpose of this 
activity is to fight crime68. These data may be transferred (made available) 
to state authorities on the terms - and with the guarantee of individual 
rights - specified in Directive 2016/680. Sharing data is allowed only for 
the purposes of preventing or combating crime, at the request of a given 
person, he should be provided with information whether his personal 
data (including location data) have been processed by the police69, and he 
67 See: Zob. szerzej: DOCKSEY, Christopher. Ministerio Fiscal: Holding the 
line on ePrivacy. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 
26, no. 4, p. 585–594, 2019; THIERSE, Stephen. The Never-Ending Story of 
Data Retention in the EU, [in:] THEIERSE, Stephen, BADANJAK, Sanja. Op-
position in the EU Multi-Level Polity. Legal Mobilization against the Data 
Retention Directive. Springer 2020, p. 11-26; ZUBIK, Marek, PODKOWIK, 
Jan, RYBSKI, Robert. Prywatność. Wolność u progu D-day. Gdańskie Studia 
Prawnicze, t. XL, p. 391-408, 2018, OJANEN, Tuomas. Privacy Is More Than 
Just a Seven-Letter Word: The Court of Justice of the European Union Sets 
Constitutional Limits on Mass Surveillance: Court of Justice of the European 
Union Decision of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 
Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, European Constitutional Law 
Review, v. 10, no. 3, p. 528-541; MURPHY, Maria Helen. Data Retention in the 
Aftermath of Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger. Irish Criminal Law Journal 
t. 105, v. 24, no. 4, 2014; CELESTE, Edoardo. The Court of Justice and the Ban 
on Bulk Data Retention: Expansive Potential and Future Scenarios. European 
Constitutional Law Review, no. 15, p. 134–157, 2019. 
68 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL Campos Sanchez-Bordona, delivered 
on 15 January 2020, case no. C-520/18; http://curia.europa.eu/. 
69 See: article 13 and 14 of the directive 2016/680. The limitation of those 
rights: see: the Article 15 of the directive 2016/680. A person shall be in-
formed ex officio if the violation of personal data involves a threat to his or 
her life, health or safety. See: the Article 31 of the Directive 2016/680.
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may request the deletion of his data if it is useless to achieve the objectives 
referred to in the directive, or they are obsolete or have been obtained 
unlawfully70. Control over the correctness of personal data processing in 
connection with the prevention and combating of crime should be exercised 
by an independent authority, and the individual concerned - if his/her 
data has not been deleted despite the request or considers that it is being 
processed unlawfully - may bring the matter to court71.
However, EU regulations do not specify in which cases location 
data can be obtained, nor do they indicate how long this data can be 
stored. The provision of the Article 15 of the Directive 2002/58 indicates 
that the data collected by service providers may be transferred to law 
enforcement authorities in order to combat “criminal offences”, and the 
Article 5 of the Directive 2016/680 requires EU countries to introduce 
“appropriate deadlines for the deletion of personal data or for periodic 
review of the necessity to retain personal data”. The EU legislator has left 
the Member States a margin of discretion in regulating the issue, i.e. in 
what cases and for what purposes the data will be collected, and for what 
period of time they will be stored. However, Member States’ freedom of 
implementation is controlled by the EU Court of Justice.
In the Tele2 and Watson judgement72, the CJEU assessed the 
rules in force in Sweden and the United Kingdom. The law in force in 
Sweden obliged the provider of electronic communications services 
to provide - at the request of the prosecutor’s office, the police or 
another authority responsible for combating crime - the subscriber’s 
data if they relate to an alleged infringement, without the subject of 
criminal proceedings having to be a “serious crime”73. The solutions 
70 See: the Article 16 of the Directive 2016/680. 
71 See: the Article 17 sec. 3 of the Directive 2016/680.
72 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 21 December 
2016, C-203/15 and C-698/15. The courts referred questions for a prelimi-
nary ruling after the CJEU judgment in Digital Rights Ireland annulled the 
so-called Retention Directive, and the regulations in force in Sweden and the 
United Kingdom in connection with which the question was referred for a 
preliminary ruling were the implementation of the above directive.
73 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 21 December 
2016, C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 and Watson, § 25. The question of the 
Sweden Court: see § 51. 
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adopted in the United Kingdom did not specify the scope of access to 
location data74. The body established to prevent and combat crimes 
had the right to request the mobile network operator to disclose data 
due to: national security, economic interests of the state, protection 
of public health, the need to prevent or detect crimes or to prevent 
violations of public order, to determine the size or collection of taxes, 
levies, fees or other obligations, contributions or charges due to a 
state administration unit, emergencies, in order to prevent injuries or 
damage to the physical or mental health of a person, or to reduce the 
extent of damage to a person’s physical or mental health. In addition, 
the minister of the interior could, by order, specify other situations in 
which state authorities could gain access to location data.
In the judgement of Tele2 and Watson, the EU Court of Justice 
recalled that under the Article 5 of the Directive 2002/58, the protection 
of the confidentiality of electronic communications is intended to 
prevent any unlawful access to data, including data related to a message 
(i.e. location data)75, irrespective of whether such access could be 
obtained by public (state) or private entities. The provisions imposing 
an obligation on telecommunications service providers to provide data 
fall within the scope of Art. 5 of Directive 2002/58. The CJEU has 
formulated general rules for data retention, including location data, 
and then for their transfer to trial authorities. Firstly, clear and precise 
rules should be introduced in national law regarding the scope and 
manner of the data storage measure to be applied. The way in which 
the concept of “national security” is understood in the EU countries 
does not fall within the scope of the CJEU. However, the Luxembourg 
Court assesses whether the law in force in a given state does not allow 
for unauthorised and disproportionate interference with the right to 
privacy of an individual76. Secondly, data retention must be carried out 
on the basis of objective criteria that show the link between the data that 
has been retained and the legitimate purpose for which the retention 
74 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 21 Decem-
ber 2016, C-203/15 and C-698/15, § 33. The question of the Sweden Court: 
see § 59. 
75 Ibidem, § 77.
76 Ibidem, § 94-96.
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is intended. Third, these criteria must enable the identification and 
tracking of persons who have, even indirectly, a connection with serious 
crime. National regulations that ensure universal access to the retained 
data are inconsistent with EU law, regardless of the existence of any 
connection with one of the purposes indicated in art. 15 of Directive 
2002/58. The generalised and non-differentiated obligation to retain all 
traffic and location data of all subscribers and users disproportionately 
violates the fundamental rights of Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter77. 
Users of telecommunications networks cannot be under the constant 
state surveillance and they should not be afraid that their every move 
is tracked, registered and may be used against them in the future. In 
addition, it is necessary to introduce a storage date for location data - it is 
unacceptable to store information about an entity longer than necessary 
to ensure public safety.
In response to the preliminary questions, the CJEU questioned 
the solutions in force in Sweden and the United Kingdom and ruled that 
the Article 15 par. 1 of the Directive 2002/58 in conjunction with the 
Articles 7, 8, 11 and art. 52 sec. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union should be interpreted in such a way that it precludes 
national legislation:
 ▪ providing for generalised and non-differentiated retention 
of all traffic data and location data of all subscribers and 
registered users of all electronic means of communication 
for the purposes of combating crime; and
 ▪ concerning the protection and security of traffic and loca-
tion data, and in particular access by competent national 
authorities to stored data, which, in the context of combating 
crime, does not restrict such access only for the purpose of 
combating serious crime, and does not make the granting 
of such access conditional from prior control by a court or 
an independent administrative authority and do not require 
that the data be stored within the Union.
77 See also: OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL Campos Sanchez-Bordona, 
delivered on 15 January 2020, case no. C-520/18, § 72.
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The issue of obtaining access to location data was also resolved in 
the Privacy International case78. The basis for a request by the British court 
for a preliminary ruling79 was the doubt whether the provisions allowing 
the mass acquisition of telecommunications data regarding traffic and 
location of the individual from providers of electronic communications 
services80 on the basis of orders issued by the secretary of state to use 
such collected information to ensure state security81 are consistent with 
EU law82. British regulations allowed for undifferentiated and generalised 
access to location data. In order for geolocation information to be passed 
on to the security services, it was not necessary to prove that the person 
was related to an activity that could pose a threat to national security.
The CJEU reminded that any interference with the privacy of 
an individual must meet the condition of proportionality83. Limitation 
of privacy may occur within strictly defined limits and only when it 
is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim (e.g. ensuring public security, 
78 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 October 
2020, Privacy International, C-623/17.
79 The preliminary question; see: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION. Judgment of 6 October 2020, Privacy International, C-623/17, § 29. 
80 The data was gathered by the British Secret Services: MI5, MI6, GCHQ. See: 
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 October 
2020, Privacy International, C-623/17, § 20
81 See also: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 
October 2020, Privacy International, C-623/17; § 16-18. The British, Hungari-
an, Polish, Czech Republic governments have raised objections, pointing out 
that national security is an exclusive matter for Member States and does not 
fall within the scope of Directive 2002/58, so the EU CJ has no jurisdiction 
to rule on it. See also: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
Judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and the Others, C-511/18, 
C-512/18 and C-520/18, § 87-103.
82 The Directive 2002/58.
83 The problem of the proportionality of interference with the right to privacy - 
with regard to telephone user/consumer data - was examined by the CJEU 
in the case Minister Fiscal. See: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION. Judgment of 2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal, C-207/16, § 55. An in-
terference with the rights of the individual may be considered proportionate 
if, given the seriousness of the offence, the circumstances of the case, it is 
more beneficial - from the perspective of the general public - to restrict the 
rights of the individual.
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fighting crime)84. These goals cannot be pursued at all costs, i.e. without 
taking into account and respecting the rights of an individual85. Legal 
regulations allowing for the intrusion into the privacy of an individual 
must meet the conditions of specificity, i.e. indicate the grounds and 
scope of the restriction (i.e. what data will be processed) and provide 
for procedural guarantees that will reduce the risk of abuse. It is about 
creating effective mechanisms that will ensure that data will be processed 
only to the extent that it is necessary86. It is worth emphasising, however, 
that the EU Court of Justice indicated that the goal of ensuring national 
(public) security allows for further restrictions on fundamental rights 
than combating crime, including serious crimes. State authorities must 
have adequate and effective methods of obtaining information about 
possible threats that could destabilise the state’s activity - constitutional, 
political or social structures in the country - and directly threaten society 
and the population87. However, the pursuit of national security does not 
allow for general, universal and undifferentiated collection and processing 
of location data. In response to a question from a British court, the 
Luxembourg Court found that the provisions in force in the United 
Kingdom were incompatible with EU law. It indicated that the Article 
15 sec. 1 of the Directive 2002/58 in connection with the Article 4 sec. 
84 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 October 
2020, Privacy International, C-623/17; § 77.
85 The private interest and the interest of the general public must be properly 
balanced. A priori it cannot be assumed that ensuring public safety and pub-
lic security in every case is more important than the rights and freedoms of 
an individual. See: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judg-
ment of 6 October 2020, Privacy International, C-623/17, § 67 and COURT 
OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 8 April 2020, Digital 
Rights Ireland, C-293/12 and C-594/12, § 52.
86 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 October 
2020, Privacy International, C-623/17, § 74; COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and 
the Others, C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, § 132.
87 These include terrorist activities. See: COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 October 2020, Privacy International, C-623/17, 
§ 74; COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 Oc-
tober 2020, La Quadrature du Net and the Others, C-511/18, C-512/18 and 
C-520/18, § 135.
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2 TEU88, as well as the Article 7, 8 and 11 and 52 sec. 1 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, “must be interpreted as 
precluding national legislation enabling a state authority to impose on 
providers of electronic communications services a generalised and non-
differentiated obligation to transmit traffic and location data to intelligence 
and security services for national security protection purposes”.
The problem of bulk retention of location data was also analysed 
in the judgment of La Quadraturedu Net and the Others89. In these 
proceedings, the Luxembourg Court examined French and Belgian 
legislation which allowed for the preventive retention of traffic and 
location data in order to ensure public safety and prevent serious crimes90. 
Nevertheless, even if location data is preventively retained to ensure 
national security, such actions by state authorities must be limited to what 
is absolutely necessary. It is necessary to introduce restrictions (e.g. by 
establishing the subjective and temporal scope) and safeguards that will 
enable effective protection of the data of persons for whom the data has 
been disclosed to state authorities against the risk of abuse91. Systematic, 
continuous and unlimited retention of location data is unacceptable. In 
addition, decisions obliging providers of electronic communications 
services to retain location and traffic data and then transfer them to 
state authorities should be subject to effective review by a court or an 
independent administrative authority, which will be able to assess the 
legality of actions taken by procedural authorities92. With regard to the 
88 The Treaty on European Union; consolidate version published in the Official 
Journal no C 326 on 26 October 2012. Access on December 20,2020. https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/. 
89 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 Octo-
ber 2020, La Quadrature du Net and the Others, C-511/18, C-512/18 and 
C-520/18. 
90 One of the positive obligations of the state from theArticle 8 of the ECHR 
and Article 7 of the Charter is the introduction of appropriate substantive 
and procedural provisions which will make it possible to effectively combat 
serious crime and ensure universal security.
91 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 Octo-
ber 2020, La Quadrature du Net and the Others, C-511/18, C-512/18 and 
C-520/18, § 138.
92 Ibidem, § 139.
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implementation of the goal of ensuring universal security, the CJEU 
allowed - under the above-mentioned conditions - preventive retention 
and collection of location data. Conversely, the massive, preventive 
retention of location and traffic data for the purposes of crime prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution is unacceptable. The Court 
found that national legislation which provides for the general and non-
differentiated retention of these data goes beyond what is necessary to 
combat serious crime and cannot be justified in a democratic society93. 
French and Belgian legislation allowed for the retention of location data 
of all users of electronic communications services, even if they were not, 
even indirectly, in a situation that could lead to criminal proceedings 
against them. These regulations also included persons whose behaviour 
did not pose any threat to public safety94. It does not matter whether the 
retained data was used in subsequent criminal proceedings. It is important 
that the procedural bodies entered the sphere of privacy of the individual, 
violating the confidentiality of communication, expressed in the Article 
5 of the Directive 2002/5895. The very possibility of accessing personal 
data is an interference with the right to privacy.
The CJEU formulated general conditions as should be met by 
the national laws of European Union member states. It is necessary to 
introduce time, geographic and subjective restrictions - data may be 
retained on the location of persons suspected of committing a serious 
crime, persons otherwise involved in criminal activity and persons 
who could, for other reasons, contribute to the fight against serious 
crime96. Geographical and subject restrictions must be established on 
the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors97. The retention 
93 Ibidem, § 141.
94 Ibidem, § 143. 
95 Ibidem, § 116. 
96 E.g. husband, wife or other close relatives to members of criminal groups 
(organized crimes groups). 
97 On the geographical scope, the Court pointed out that these are areas with a 
high risk of serious crime, such as urban infrastructure regularly visited by 
large numbers of people, or strategic locations such as airports or railway 
stations. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Judgment of 6 
October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and the Others, C-511/18, C-512/18 and 
C-520/18, § 150. 
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time of the location data must not exceed what is strictly necessary for 
the intended purpose.
4.3. PArtiAl conclusions 
In conclusion, the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts consider 
that access to ex post location data - previously retained by mobile network 
operators - is an interference with the right to privacy (the Article 8 of 
the ECHR, the Article 7 of the Charter). However, this interference is 
permissible if there are appropriate legal bases in national law, its purpose 
is to protect the values  expressed in the Article 8 sec. 2 of the ECHR and, 
moreover, has been limited to what is necessary in a democratic society. 
The ECtHR and the CJEU considered the problem of retention and access 
to geolocation data from different perspectives. The Strasbourg Court 
assessed whether, in a specific case, the application of domestic provisions 
did not result in a violation of the Article 8 of the ECHR. In the Ringler 
and Tretter and others vs. Austria cases, the applicants tried to induce 
the ECtHR to analyse abstractly the domestic provisions allowing - in 
practice - the massive collection of location data. In this regard, the Court 
did not reply to the applicants. While examining the system of national 
measures to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals - introduced 
in connection with the need to implement EU regulations - it concluded 
that they allow for the enforcement of effective protection of the right to 
privacy in ‘state’ proceedings, so Strasbourg intervention is not necessary.
The Luxembourg Court assessed the regulations of the European 
Union countries that allowed for the mass retention of data on the location 
of users of telecommunications networks98. It was possible to obtain 
geolocation information about any person, regardless of whether they 
were involved, even indirectly, with any crime. The introduction of 
such regulations was justified by the need to protect and ensure national 
security as well as the prevention and combating of serious crime. 
98 The Court considered that the blanket and indiscriminate obligation to retain 
all traffic and location data of mobile phone users disproportionately inter-
feres with the fundamental rights protected under Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the 
Charter.
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However, the CJEU recognised that any personal data retention system 
(including location data) must be organized in such a way that it cannot be 
transformed into an undifferentiated and general collection of information 
about individuals99. Society cannot be under constant surveillance of 
state organs. The fight against terrorism and the protection of national 
security cannot be considered only taking into account the criterion of 
the effectiveness of actions taken. Each time, the insurmountable limit is 
respect for the rights of individuals and finding the right balance between 
the common good and the sphere of individual rights and freedoms. 
Retaining location data is possible, but on the condition that:
1. clear and precise rules have been introduced regarding the 
scope and method of data retention, processing and storage 
(subject, geographic and temporal limitations);
2. there are objective criteria defining the link between the 
data to be retained and stored and the legitimate purpose 
(combating serious crime, protecting national security);
3. they concern people who are involved - even indirectly - with 
serious crime, and at the same time there are mechanisms 
protecting against obtaining data about the location of other 
people not involved in criminal activity100.
5. concLusIons
Obtaining information about the location by state authorities and 
the related analysis of the routine of an individual’s life is an interference 
with the right to privacy (the Article 8 of the ECHR, the Article 7 of 
the Charter). Due to the development of technology, law enforcement 
authorities of a given state can easily collect data relevant to the conducted 
proceedings. Almost every person uses a mobile phone (smartphone) with 
99 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered on 
15 January 2020, C-623/17, Privacy International. http://curia.europa.eu/.
100 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered 
on 15 January 2020, C-623/17, Privacy International. http://curia.europa.
eu/. See also: OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL Campos Sanchez-Bordo-
na delivered on 15 January 2020, C-520/18.
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GPS, so the services responsible for public safety no longer need to install 
separate transmitters to track (reproduce) the behaviour of a given person. 
The ease of obtaining information about the location and its usefulness 
for achieving the goal of combating and preventing crime, ensuring public 
safety, gives rise to the risk of abuse. Although the right to privacy is not 
an absolute right and is subject to limitations due to the overwhelming 
social (public) interest, it is necessary to properly balance the interests of 
the individual and society. European courts try to define the relationship 
between respecting fundamental rights and the obligation to prevent and 
combat serious crime. Based on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the 
CJEU, it can be deduced in which circumstances the collection of location 
data does not violate the fundamental rights of an individual.
Compared to other investigative techniques, the collection 
of location data violates the right to privacy to a lesser extent than, 
for example, control and recording of conversations or audiovisual 
observation. The Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts recognise the 
acquisition of geolocation data in real time as a more painful method 
(interfering in a greater scope in the right to privacy of the individual) 
from obtaining ex post location data from mobile network operators. 
The degree of interference with the right to privacy and the affliction of 
a given method affect the material scope (in which cases such methods 
are permissible), the subjective scope (determining the group of people 
whose location data can be obtained), and temporal (how long a given 
measure can be used).
Regarding the collection of real-time location data, the ECtHR 
stresses that the use of this covert surveillance method is only permissible 
in connection with serious crime. The decision to apply geolocation 
surveillance to a specific person does not have to be taken by a judicial 
authority. Ex-post judicial control is sufficient, i.e. at the stage of assessing 
whether the geolocation data has been obtained lawfully and whether it 
can be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. The Strasbourg Court 
draws attention to the existence of clear and precise provisions in domestic 
law, specifying the basic principles and conditions for the application 
of geolocation surveillance, and assesses whether in a specific case the 
collection of location data served one of the purposes set out in the 
Article 8 sec. 2 of the ECHR.
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Striving to protect national security, combating serious crime, 
etc. does not entitle state authorities to massive and automated real-time 
monitoring of an entire society. A person or group of persons to whom 
geolocation surveillance is applied must be associated - even indirectly - 
with criminal activity that poses a threat to public security. The European 
Union Court of Justice in the judgement of La Quadraturedu Net and the 
Others emphasised that collecting location data for groups is admissible, 
provided that such action serves solely the protection of national security. 
It is necessary to introduce regulations that will minimise the risk of abuse. 
The decision to include a group of people under automated geolocation 
must be taken by a judicial authority or other independent body, and then, 
before the location information is used as evidence in the proceedings, a 
personalised ex-post control by the court is necessary. However, it should 
be emphasised that the Luxembourg Court ruled out the possibility of 
using automated, continuous monitoring of the movement of groups of 
people in order to combat crime, but on the condition that data collected 
by automated means are subject to non-automated analysis before being 
used in the future.
Obtaining location data ex post, i.e. from mobile network 
operators constitutes less interference with the right to privacy. Procedural 
authorities may, in individual cases, request geolocation information 
not only when the subject of the proceedings is a serious crime, but also 
in relation to prohibited acts of a lower gravity. However, national law 
may not require mobile network operators to retain location data in a 
compulsory manner. It is necessary to introduce criteria limiting the 
subjective and objective circle, determining the time of data retention and 
a system of domestic remedies that will allow a person whose rights have 
been violated to assert his or her rights before the courts of a given state.
When analysing the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CJEU, 
one can see a difference in the approach to the protection of individual 
privacy in relation to the collection of location data. Firstly, the ECtHR 
assesses whether, in a specific case, the investigative measures applied 
had a proper basis in national law, were proportionate and necessary in 
a democratic society. As a general rule, it does not assess the laws of the 
Council of Europe states in general. It reacts post factum to flawed action 
by state authorities. The CJEU, on the other hand, examines national 
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legislation in isolation from the circumstances of the particular case. It 
checks whether the adopted solutions can be reconciled with EU law 
(and the EU level of protection of fundamental rights). 
Secondly, the lengthiness of the ECtHR proceedings means that 
the decisions concerning the collection of location data are inadequate to 
the current technological possibilities. The Strasbourg Court has not yet 
addressed the issue of automatic processing and collection of data in real 
time, and thus has not determined under what conditions such information 
obtained may be used in a criminal trial. For this reason, among others, 
the CJEU is in a better position to develop coherent, European (EU) rules 
for the collection and processing of location data in the future. The case 
law of the Luxembourg court also has the advantage of pointing in the 
right direction and suggesting to EU countries how they should amend 
their national laws.
A major challenge to the protection of individual privacy is the 
problem of mass and automated collection of location data101. In order 
to protect national security, in the La Quadre du net judgment, the CJEU 
allowed for this, provided that the data are individualised and analysed 
in a traditional (non-automated) way before being used in criminal 
proceedings. Also the ECtHR - if criteria are specified in national law - 
allows for the bulk collection of data on an individual102. 
To sum up, it seems that the European Courts are trying to create 
a harmonised (or at least inconsistent) standard of protection of the right 
to privacy in relation to the collection of location data for the purpose 
of preventing and combating serious crime. The ECtHR does not try to 
101 The problem of bulk collection of data on an individual was also the subject 
of Opinion 1/15 on the draft agreement between Canada and the European 
Union on the transfer and processing of passenger name records. Advocate 
General Paolo Mengozzi refers, inter alia, to the problem of automated data 
processing (see paragraph 252). The position presented in this opinion is in 
line with that of the Judgment of La Quadre du Net, although the issue ad-
dressed in that judgment concerned location data. See: OPINION OF ADVO-
CATE GENERAL Paolo Mengozzi, delivered on 8 September 2016, opinion 
1/15; http://curia.europa.eu/.
102 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 10 July 2019, 
Big Brother Watch and the Others v the United Kingdom, case no. 58170/13, 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
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interfere with the competences of the CJEU, and the CJEU - in creating 
an EU model of protection of the right to privacy - is based on the case 
law of the ECtHR. The case law of the ECtHR is late in relation to the 
developing technological possibilities, but the existing Strasbourg acquis, 
the general conditions for interference with the right to privacy, provides 
a good basis for the CJEU to create a model within the EU which, on the 
one hand, will protect the public against serious crime and, on the other 
hand, will not lead to a disproportionate interference with individual 
freedoms and rights. 
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